. Vice PresidentJohnson,Ngo Dinh Diem,and Ambassador Frederick Nolting in South Vietnam's Presidential Palace in 1961(Wikipedia). Such a government would, I hope, be so responsive to the nationalist aspirations of its
American aid given directly to your Government can serve to assist Viet-Nam in its present
nhng n anh ln (Nguyn Tng Phong), Phn Tng - Bn c n cn (T Gn) Chun Tng L Lodge told Diem that he knew little about Vietnam but hoped to advise him on American affairs. The discussion that followed is remarkable for the unanimity that had developed among nearly all of Kennedys advisors against Diem. So he pledged support to an emerging leaderNgo Dinh Diema devout Catholic and fervent anti-French, anti-Communist nationalist. contribution to the welfare and stability of the Government of Viet-Nam. Kennedy wanted Lodge to make a personal assessment. A Christian Vietnamese named Ngo Dinh Diem had been in the United States between 1950 and 1954, and there he had met Cardinal Francis Spellman and Senator John F. Kennedy. Conscription of Vietnamese peasants for service in World War I (1916) Diem made conflicting claims that the Buddhists were being stirred up by communist cadres and that the crisis was entirely solved. The National Security Archive documented this event in some detail in our 2003 electronic briefing book, where we presented the meeting agenda, a tape of the conversation, the NSC meeting record, and two draft cables to Saigon that the participants considered (2003 E-book, Documents 18, 19, 20, and 21 plus audio clip). The South Vietnamese demands for American support became more insistent in the second half of August, 1963, and the posting presented the National Security Council (NSC) and State Department records of a series of White House meetings and other U.S. deliberations over a coup in Saigon. Back at the embassy Lodge confronted Harkins over his intervention with the South Vietnamese officer (Document 22). Vn Hng, History of Strategic SAIGON, Vietnam, Oct. 24 -- In a letter to Premier Ngo Dinh Diem, President Eisenhower has expressed the hope that "indispensable reforms" would be carried out by South Vietnam in connection with the receipt of United States aid. Since then, however, some officers turned against the movement once the political aims of some Buddhist leaders became more apparent, blaming the Diem government for being ineffective in dealing with the problem. CIA Director Colby described a Saigon situation that pictured the pro-regime forces as stronger than the plotters. Nhu suggested that he was not a central figure in the actions undertaken against the Buddhists, although he was in support of them. [4] Accounts of the CIA meetings with General Khiem on September 16 (CIA Saigon cable 0940) and 26 (Saigon cable 1222) appear in FRUS, IV, pp. Colby said the coup forces were roughly equal in strength to those that remained loyal to Diem. Letter from President in its present hour of trial, provided that your Government is prepared for Medieval Studies. ND c c lm Th Tng (HNT & TTN), TT Military opponents coalesced around General Maxwell D. Taylor, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and included General Krulak; while another center of opposition included CIA Director John McCone and his responsible division chief, William E. Colby. Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research Thomas L. Hughes made notes of White House conversations with National Security Council staff member Michael Forrestal and Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Roger Hilsman during August 24-28, 1963, which he referred to as coup planning week. Vietnam took up most of the discussions, including criticism of Nhus explanation for the series of events that led to the pagoda raids which Forrestal said was what he wanted us to hear. They agreed that the Diem government could not survive another 12 months. Tng Thng Ng President Ford on Americas post-Vietnam recovery (April 1975). C. protect Western oil interests. Among the findings from the present posting or from our several Diem E-books taken together are the following: Vietnam perplexed American leaders from Franklin D. Roosevelt on. Viet Minh call to arms against the Japanese (March 1945) contribute effectively toward an independent Viet-Nam endowed with a strong government. He had returned to consult with JFK about the coup, learned while en route that Kennedy had been killed, and instead briefed LBJ while still in his EOB office (along with Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara, and George Ball). While a popular proposal in Washington had been to somehow separate Diem from Nhu, Hughes explained why it would be difficult to achieve that: Diem and Nhu were more inseparable than ever. Nhu spoke out in response to signals that the U.S. planned to cut foreign aid, dismissing the speculation by saying that South Vietnam had sufficient reserves to operate for twenty years. Here we add Krulaks records on the other meetings (Documents 9, 11) and Bromley Smiths handwritten notes, from which he derived the records we had previously posted (Documents 10, 12). In a meeting between President Kennedy and his top advisors, even at that late hour they seemed divided over a possible coup. Ngo Dinh Diem explains why he rejects national elections (July 1955) Letter From Eisenhower to Ngo Dinh Diem - The Vietnam War A Letter From Eisenhower to Ngo Dinh Diem October 23, 1954 Dear Mr. President, I have been following with great interest the course of developments in Vietnam, particularly since the conclusion of the conference at Geneva. In 2003 we posted an electronic briefing book with one of the first-released Kennedy tape recordings of a key White House deliberation on the final go-ahead for the coup. ISBN: 978-1-6209-7088-1, National Security Archive Lodge left for Saigon, planning to stop in Hawaii and Japan on his way to receive various briefings and touch base with senior U.S. officials. Permission is Lyndon Johnson on the political aims of the Vietnam War (June 1966) Forrestal also commented, without further elaboration, that others had not been privy to the latest Lodge-JFK private communications. Bobby Kennedy spoke little in the August meetings and was absent from the August 26 session, when anger over the Hilsman cable should have been most focused. 35+ YEARS OF FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACTION, FOIA Advisory Committee Oversight Reports, The Diem Coup After 50 Years John F. Kennedy and South Vietnam, 1963, Kennedy Considered Supporting Coup in South Vietnam, August 1963, The Last Brahmin: Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. and the Making of the Cold War, William Colby and the CIA: The Secret Wars of a Controversial Spymaster, Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable War, 1945-1975, The Ghosts of Langley: Into the CIA's Heart of Darkness. The Sourcebook is a collection of public domain and
Reprinted from The Department of State Bulletin (November 15, 1954), pp. More than on earlier occasions, he recorded, Diem talked largely to himself. The Saigon potentate defended his stance in the Buddhist crisis, and defended his brothers Nhu and Thuc, the archbishop of Hue, whose antics had touched off the crisis. By that I was saying that, if Diem was removed we would have not one coup .
Rather than revisit all of that debate, here we want to touch on a few points, presenting nuances in the form of the Thomas Hughes notes (Document 6) and meetings with Diem and Nhu that were taking place within this timeframe (Documents 8, 14, 15), amplifying the evidence. The implication is that Mike [Forrestal] is.. Vn Ph Anonymous poem about French oppression in Vietnam (1900) The next day, Nolting added that the notion of a coup was based on a bad principle and would set a bad precedent, a statement that impressed National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy (Documents 11, 12). The CIA learned of a talk he had had with ARVN commanders in the Saigon area where Nhu asserted that a cutoff of foreign aid would not be a problem because South Vietnam had enough foreign currency reserves to continue for 20 years. So did South Vietnamese. Nhu ordered that ARVN soldiers be instructed to open fire on any foreigners involved in provocative acts., American officials differed on who might follow Diem and Nhu in leading Saigon. since the conclusion of the conference at Geneva. There was still time to pull back. In a follow-up meeting the next day, another briefing by William Colby summarized the scene in Saigon.
President Eisenhower's Letter to Ngo Dinh Diem, President of the Nhu claimed that Ngo Dinh Diem himself approved the pagoda raids against the Buddhists in response to demands made by South Vietnamese army officers for Diem to deal with recent political agitation in Saigon. By the time John F. Kennedy was president, the situation seemed hopeful for a momentlong enough for JFK to think of Vietnam as a sort of laboratory where he could try out tactics and techniques. While Minh said he did not expect U.S. support for a coup, he wanted to ensure that no effort would be made to thwart a change in government. EISENHOWER'S LETTER TO NGO DINH DIEM, October 23, 1954 Dear Mr. President; I have been following with great interest the course of developments in Vietnam, particularly since the conclusion of the conference at Geneva. with great interest the course of developments in Viet-Nam, particularly Nhu thought it would take involvement by the United States to seek an end to the present crisis. They spoke with academic Vietnam experts, the CIA station chief, and President Diem. It hopes that such aid, combined with your own continuing efforts, will contribute effectively toward an independent Viet-Nam endowed with a strong government. Modern History Sourcebook, Fordham University Center
24, f.: Meetings on Vietnam, August-November 1963.. Again, the 2003 E-book presented an array of materials on these events (Documents 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28), ranging from Kennedys White House sessions to monitor events, to the CIA daily situation reports, to a cable relating several versions of how Diem and Nhu died, to a CIA retrospective analysis of press coverage of the deaths. hour of trial, provided that your Government is prepared to give assurances as to the
After Conein had provided assurance to Big Minh that the U.S. would not thwart a coup, General Tran Van Don asked Conein why General Paul Harkins, Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), said the day before that it was the wrong time for a coup and that the planners should desist in their efforts. Le Duan: The path of revolution in the South (1956) Nhu claimed he was prepared to join them which could have been an effort to unmask the coup plotters and their grievances rather than a genuine statement of support.
File : Ngo Dinh Diem at Washington - ARC 542189.jpg I am, accordingly, instructing the American Ambassador to Viet-Nam to examine with you in your capacity as Chief of Government, bow an intelligent program of American aid given directly to your Government can serve to assist Viet-Nam in its present hour of trial, provided that your Government is prepared to give assurances as to the standards of performance it would be able to maintain in the event such aid were supplied. The Presidents Intelligence Checklist for the morning of November 1 began with an update that a coup had begun in Saigon. With the exception of primary sources, all content on this website is Alpha History 2018. November 15, 1954, pp.735-736. During his trip the Saigon situation escalated as Nhu went ahead to launch the raids on the Buddhist pagodas he had already planned. [6] CIA Saigon cable 1385, October 3, 1963, ibid., p. 354. Compare this with Document 10 here, and Items 9 (audio), 10 and 11 of E-book 302. Quotations about the massacre at My Lai hamlet (1968) The citizens of America saw this, not as an opportunity, but as a danger to their precious country.
